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This paper exploits the introduction of the first regularized patent 
system, which appeared in the Venetian Republic in 1474, to examine 
the factors shaping inventors’ propensity to use a new form of 
intellectual property. We combine detailed information on craft guilds 
and patents in Renaissance Venice and show a negative association 
between patenting activity and guild statutory norms that strongly 
restricted entry and price competition. Our analysis shows that the 
heterogeneity in patenting activity documented by the industrial 
organization literature is not a special feature of modern technologies, 
but is rather a persistent phenomenon affected by market power.
I. INTRODUCTION
PatentS provide temporary monopoly riGhtS over a new technology that 
generate rents to the innovator and support private contracting. The 
industrial economics literature has documented a large variation in the rate 
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of patenting across industries and in the perceived effectiveness of patents 
across firms (Schankerman and Pakes [1986]; Hall and Ziedonis [2001]; von 
Graevenitz et al. [2013]). These findings have typically been interpreted as 
suggesting that the social and economic value provided by intellectual prop-
erty rights is highly heterogeneous. Understanding the roots of this hetero-
geneity - i.e., why some inventors choose to rely heavily on patents and why 
others do not - is essential for the design of patent policies. If, for example, a 
substantial share of innovation occurs in industries in which patents do not 
play an important role, policies that strengthen intellectual property rights 
may do little to raise the overall level of innovation (Machlup and Penrose 
[1950]; Moser [2012]). Similarly, when only a few industries rely heavily on 
patent rights, changes in patent policies may dramatically affect the direction 
of technical change (Moser [2005]). If  the effects of patent rights are highly 
heterogeneous across firms and industries, it is likely that a one-size-fits-all 
patent system, like the one currently in place, is second best (Acemoglu and 
Akcigit [2012]).
In this paper we use historical data to investigate whether the heterogene-
ity in patent strategies documented by the literature is a recent phenomenon 
driven by modern technology trends, or a persistent feature of innovation 
that can be linked to more fundamental economic forces. We exploit the in-
troduction of the first regularized patent system, which appeared during the 
Renaissance in the Venetian Republic, to examine how market power and 
other local conditions relate to the propensity of inventors to use the new 
form of intellectual property. In 1474 the Venetian Senate passed a patent 
act that regulated the granting of patents for novelty, ingenuity, and utility. 
The dominant view among patent law historians is that this act established 
an administrative-centered system, strikingly similar to the modern Anglo-
American system (Kaufer [1988]; Merges and Duffy [2013]). Therefore, the 
patents awarded in the late fifteenth century in the Venetian Republic provide 
a unique opportunity to study the diffusion of a drastically new form of 
property rights.
We begin our analysis with a simple theoretical model that describes the 
patenting decision of inventors at the time of the Venetian Republic. The 
theoretical framework highlights a few key differences between the modern 
patent regime and the Venetian system and explores the interaction between 
patent law and guilds, associations of craftsmen and merchants that played 
a key role in Medieval and Renaissance Europe. We show that the interplay 
of these institutional features implies that the level of patenting can vary 
substantially across guilds. More specifically, the model shows that the level 
of patenting in a technology area is strongly related to the ability of guild 
statutes to prevent entry of outsiders and to mitigate competition among 
members. The market power generated by these statutory restrictions allow 
guild members to extract high rents, and this increases their incentives to 
prevent patenting by other members and external innovators.
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Our empirical analysis exploits a new dataset which combines information 
on the patents granted by the Venetian Senate with detailed digitized data on 
craft guilds operating in the cities of the Venetian Republic. Our sample com-
prises 340 guilds of the Venetian Republic whose statutes have been exam-
ined and coded by a team of Italian historians as part of a research project 
financed by the Italian Ministry for Education, Universities and Research.
The main findings are as follows. First, we show a strong negative associ-
ation between patenting in the technology sector of a guild and the presence 
of statutory rules which strongly limit entry and competition. Results are 
robust to including controls for city and guild characteristics, and to using 
alternative econometric models. A variety of placebo tests shows that only 
restrictions to entry and competition are correlated to patenting and no other 
provisions in guild statutes.
To address the concern of unobserved heterogeneity, we exploit as an in-
strumental variable the religious origin of some of the guilds in our sample. 
A number of the guilds in Northern Italy originated from medieval religious 
confraternities formed a couple of centuries before the patent act. The his-
tory literature suggests that establishment of these confraternities was driven 
by idiosyncratic reasons related to the local success of religious movements 
in the 13th century (Mackenney [1994]). To confirm the quasi-exogenous na-
ture of this variable, we show that it is orthogonal to many observable guild 
characteristics such as industry, location and a variety of statutory rules. At 
the same time, religious origin is a strong predictor for statutory provisions 
restricting entry and competition. This is because religious confraternities 
followed strict rules regulating members’ admission and interaction, and 
such rules often inspired guild statutes (Mackenney [1994]). The instrumen-
tal variable analysis confirms the negative relationship between patenting 
and the strength of guilds’ statutes.
Our second finding is that patenting was more frequent for guilds located 
in cities geographically distant from Venice. This suggests that patents were 
particularly beneficial for non-elite inventors with limited access to politi-
cal power (Khan [2005]). To study this issue in more detail, we construct a 
measure of political connection exploiting a unique database of Venetian 
nobility and marriages between patrician families and members of the Great 
Council. We find that guilds located in cities with less political connection 
were more likely to patent their technologies, supporting the idea that politi-
cally connected guilds could substitute intellectual property rights with other 
types of formal and informal protection.
Taken together, our findings suggest that local economic and political 
conditions may have a substantial impact on intellectual property strategies. 
Patent strategies in Renaissance Venice’s pre-industrial economy appear to 
be shaped by industry characteristics such as competition and barriers to 
entry. This suggests that the heterogeneity in patenting observed in modern 
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industries is not a unique feature of contemporary technologies, but rather a 
persistent phenomenon driven by basic economic forces.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II offers an overview of the 
related literature. Section III provides a brief  description of the origin and 
functioning of the Venetian patent system. In Section IV, we develop a model 
showing the link between guild statutory norms and patenting. Section V 
describes the data and discusses the econometric specification. Section VI 
examines the empirical relationship between guild statutes and patenting. In 
Section VII, we confirm the results exploiting the quasi-exogenous variation 
in guild religious origins. Section VIII studies the relationship between guild 
locations and patenting. Section IX provides a discussion of the results and 
their implication for policy. Concluding remarks summarize and discuss our 
main findings. Extensions of the theoretical model and robustness of the em-
pirical analysis are included in an online appendix available on the Journal’s 
editorial web site.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
This paper is connected to various strands of the economics history and in-
novation literatures.
II(i). Economic History
The economic history literature on the role of craft guilds and their relation-
ship with the patent system has stressed the important role of guilds in cre-
ating, protecting and transmitting technical knowledge in medieval Europe 
(inter alia see Greif  et al. [1994]; De la Croix et al. [2016]; Greif  and Tabellini 
[2017]). One of the difficulties in studying these institutions is the lack of 
comprehensive data. Our paper contributes to this line of research introduc-
ing a novel dataset on Venetian patents and guilds, which may also prove 
useful for future research.
Traditionally, historians have seen craft guilds as rent-seeking institutions 
that opposed many form of innovations (North [1981]; Olgivie [2007, 2014]), 
but recent studies have provided a more nuanced views recognizing that 
guilds were able to accommodate technological progress despite documented 
individual instances of resistance to innovation (Epstein [1998, 2004]; Molà 
[2000]).
While guild attitude toward innovation has been studied extensively, less 
attention has been devoted to their attitude toward patents. Examining the 
relationship between patents and inventions in England in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, MacLeod [1988] suggests that patents played sev-
eral functions beyond providing intellectual property protection. In particu-
lar, she highlights the role of patents as a mechanism to avoid the restrictive 
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regulations and controls imposed by guilds. According to MacLeod, this role 
was particularly important for foreign inventors and immigrants and it ex-
plains guild distrust of patents, especially those of foreigners which were seen 
as of small innovative content. The theoretical model in our paper is con-
sistent with the analysis of MacLeod [1988] as it stresses the role of patents 
to overcome entry barriers imposed by guild statutes, and it endogenously 
generates patent applications with lower surplus for guild outsiders.
Belfanti [2004, 2006] studies the relationship between guilds and patents in 
Northern Italy, focusing on their impact on circulation of technical knowledge 
across Italian cities. In his view, craft guilds and patents were complementary 
institutions whose combined effect shaped the circulation of ideas and mobil-
ity of skilled craftsmen. He stresses how guilds and patents provided alterna-
tive ways of extracting rents from innovations, which could be used within the 
same competitive context. Our analysis supports this idea by emphasizing how 
patents were more effective at providing rents when guild statutes were weaker.
Several other authors highlight the link between patents and bargaining 
among guild members after the development of a technological innovation, 
as well as the substantial variation in the attitude toward patents across in-
dustries. Turner [2008] describes the opposition of the London Clockmakers’ 
Company to several horological patents, and highlights the concerns of guild 
members to avoid excessive advantage for patent owners and to ensure that 
new technologies were shared. Epstein [1998] indicates the balance of power 
between poorer craftsmen and wealthier artisans as a crucial element for in-
novation dynamics of manufacturing guilds. Pfister [2008], examining the 
introduction of the silk ribbon engine loom, emphasizes the key role of the 
guild power structures, together with the political context and the type of 
technology. Finally, Trivellato [2008], in her analysis of Venetian silk and 
glass production, emphasizes the crucial role of intra-guild interactions and 
the importance of statutory norms. Our study contributes to this literature 
describing how bargaining between patent holders and other guild members 
was shaped by statutory provisions, which are an important dimension of 
the heterogeneity driving the different reactions of guild to patents across 
technological and geographical contexts.
II(ii). Economics of Innovation
This paper contributes to the literature on the economics of innovation and 
the determinant of firms’ intellectual property strategy. Anton and Yao [2004] 
examine the decision to patent or to keep secret an existing technology when 
patents offer limited protection against imitation. Lerner and Tirole [2004] 
analyze the decision of whether to participate in patent pools. Galasso [2012] 
studies the incentives to share patents through broad cross-license agree-
ments, and Llanes and Poblete [2014] examine whether to include a patent in 
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a technology standard. Comino and Graziano [2015] study how grant exami-
nation affects patenting strategies. Schankerman and Schuett [2018] examine 
the effects of patent screening, renewal fees and courts on patenting behavior. 
Further theoretical research is surveyed in Llobet et al. [2012]. Our paper con-
tributes to this literature by emphasizing the role of industry characteristics, 
such as competition and barriers to entry, in shaping firms’ IP strategies.
Empirically, a number of studies in the industrial economics literature 
have documented substantial heterogeneity in patenting propensity across 
and within industries (inter alia see Schankerman and Pakes [1986]; Lerner 
[1994]; Schankerman [1998]; Hall and Ziedonis [2001]; Von Graevenitz et al. 
[2013]). These papers exploit data on firms in modern U.S. and Europe. The 
work of Moser [2005, 2012, 2013] confirms this heterogeneity in patenting 
with data from the XIXth century. We add to this research by examining 
patenting strategies in the Renaissance, when economic activity, industry 
composition and political structure were substantially different than those 
of modern times. Confirming the heterogeneity in patenting and its link with 
market power suggests that the economic forces driving IP strategies are per-
sistent, rather than unique features of modern industries.
Our paper also adds to the literature on the relationship between compe-
tition and innovation (Aghion et  al. [2005]; Cohen [2010]; Spulber [2013]) 
suggesting that market power may affect not only the level of innovation 
but also the propensity to rely on patent protection. Our analysis implies 
that patent based measures of innovation activity used in the literature may 
over-estimate or under-estimate the effect of market power when it simulta-
neously affects both innovation incentives and patenting strategies.
Our research is also related to studies that examine how occupational li-
censing rules affect technology adoption. Bridgman [2015] studies why unions 
may favor restrictive work regulations and how these regulations may induce 
resistance to technology adoption. The broad literature on occupational li-
censing is surveyed in Kleiner [2000]. The contribution of our analysis is to 
illustrate how occupational licensing and self-regulation may interact with 
the propensity to use intellectual property rights.
III. RENAISSANCE VENICE AND ITS PATENT SYSTEM
This section provides a brief  historical overview of the Venetian Republic 
between the fifteenth and sixteenth century, and illustrates the main features 
of the 1474 patent act.
III(i). The Venetian Republic in the 15th and 16th Centuries
During the period of our study, the ‘Serenissima’ Republic of Venice was 
one of the largest regional economies of Renaissance Europe. Its center was 
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the maritime city of Venice with roughly 150,000 inhabitants at the end of 
the 16th century, about half  of the population of north-east Italy at that 
time (Costantini [1987]). The Venetian state included the ‘Terraferma’ do-
minion, a compact and densely populated area which included large cities 
such as Verona and Vicenza. Figure 1 (from Knapton [2013]) illustrates the 
state boundaries around the period of our study. A number of additional cit-
ies in the Greek peninsula and in South-East Europe, such as Corfu, Andros, 
and Cyprus were also under the control of the Venetian Republic and were 
instrumental ports for long-distance trade between Western Europe and the 
Levant (Borelli [1980]).
The Venetian Republic was based on a careful balance of power that orig-
inated as an attempt to restrain the power of a single person or governing 
body and led to remarkable political stability (Lane [1973]). Membership in 
the main governing institutions was precluded to lower classes, such as ar-
tisans and shopkeepers. Moreover, following the ‘Serrata’ (closure) in 1297, 
political functions were restricted to a hereditary nobility that had the exclu-
sive right to sit in the Great Council, the legislative assembly of the Republic. 
Because of the large size of the Great Council, most legislative functions 
were delegated to the Senate, a smaller assembly (about 300 senators) elected 
by the Great Council (Borelli [1980]). Some members of the Senate had the 
right of legislative initiative (‘metter parte’), others were only entitled to vote 
Figure 1  
Venetian State Boundary 
Notes: Source: Knapton [2013].
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(‘metter ballotta’). Among the senators entitled both to vote and to propose 
new laws, there were three ‘provveditori di comun’ who oversaw transport in-
frastructures and mercantile trade (Borelli [1980]; Zaggia [2004]; Di Stefano 
[2011]). The doge was the personal embodiment of the Republic; it was 
elected by a committee of 41 nobles chosen by the Great Council. In 1474 the 
doge was Nicolò Marcello, and eleven doges took office between 1474 and 
1550 (Rendina [1984]).
At the time of our study, the main threat to Venice’s trade supremacy and 
the preservation of its economic power was the Ottoman Empire, which 
was expanding dramatically under the leadership of sultan Selim I (Borelli 
[1980]). Moreover, the 1492 discovery of America started shifting the center 
of long-distance trade away from the Mediterranean toward the Atlantic.
The economy of the capital was driven by the vast trading activity in spices, 
dying materials, silk, cotton, slaves, and precious metals (Pezzolo [2013]). On 
top of this vibrant trade, artisan production also flourished both in Venice 
and in Terraferma. The Arsenal was one of the largest industrial sites in 
Europe, and glassmaking was among the most prestigious urban occupations 
at the time (Trivellato [2008]). The mainland was marked by a lively wool and 
silk production (Demo [2013]).
Merchants and craftsmen were organized in guilds, self-governed organi-
zations that controlled various aspects of economic activity. Guild statutes 
prescribed technical characteristics of products and regulated entry, appren-
ticeship, and competition (Belfanti [2004]). The Venetian government fos-
tered guild membership for fiscal reasons, and about 20 per cent of the 
population of the city of Venice belonged to a guild.1 Guild members were 
excluded from government, but the Venetian constitution guaranteed them 
the right of judicial appeal against the government and guild officers (Lane 
[1973]).
III(ii). The 1474 Patent Act
On March 19, 1474, the Venetian Senate passed by a large majority a ‘parte’ 
(act) regulating the granting of patents. While there is evidence that a small 
number of ad hoc privileges for new inventions and mineral extraction were 
granted by the Venetian government before this act (only five patents accord-
ing to Mandich [1936]), the parte of  1474 is the very first law regulating the 
patent application and granting process, and has been recognized by numer-
ous historians and law scholars as the legal foundation of the modern patent 
system (inter alia see Mandich [1948]; Duffy [2007]; Golden [2013]).
As modern patent laws, the Venetian act provided the inventor with exclu-
sive rights specifying geographical and time limits, it required disclosure 
1 This share remained stable, with minor fluctuations, from the 16th century until 1797, the 
end of the Venetian state (Costantini [1987]).
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in exchange for monopoly rights, and it established an enforcement 
mechanism – which included fines and the requisition of the illegal goods – 
to prevent imitation. The intended effect of patent protection was to stop 
‘every other person in any of our territories and towns to make any further 
device conforming with and similar to said one without the consent and li-
cense of the author’ (Mandich [1948]). Hence, the patent act granted paten-
tees the exclusive right to use their inventions but also the possibility of 
selling their patents or licensing them out. Also the patentability require-
ments closely resembled modern ones. Industrial applicability had to be 
shown by the inventor by means of a test of the new product or process (the 
‘experienza’) to illustrate, before granting the patent, the functioning of the 
invention. Novelty and non-obviousness requirements were explicitly men-
tioned in the patent act that established that the subject matter to be patented 
was required to be a ‘new and ingenious device’ (Mandich [1948]). However, 
the novelty content was evaluated on the basis of the technical knowledge 
available in the Venetian dominion, implying that a patent could be granted 
to products or processes already in use elsewhere (Molà [2014]).2
The process of patenting involved different steps. Patent applications (or 
‘suppliche’) were addressed to the doge and filed at the Senate (Mandich [1948]). 
The provveditori di comun evaluated the proposal and collected information 
from interested parties, particularly from the representatives of the relevant 
guilds. Sometimes, the Senate involved other magistrates for the necessary pre-
liminary investigations and reports. These magistrates were selected based on 
the content of the invention. For example, in the case of hydraulic devices the 
water committee (Savi sopra le acque) was involved. Patents were granted after 
Senatorial approval (Berveglieri [1995]; Mandich [1948]; Molà [2000]).3
The impact of the act on patenting was substantial. The number of patents 
granted by the Senate grew considerably, increasing from five ad hoc privi-
leges granted before 1474 (Mandich [1936]) to 43 patents approved between 
1474 and 1500, 126 patents granted in 1501-1550, and 471 patents granted 
in 1551-1600.
There are three main features of the Venetian patent system that are cen-
tral to our analysis. First, patents could be granted to all inventors regard-
less of their citizenship status or guild membership. Thus, patents were both 
‘negative’ rights to exclude but also ‘positive’ rights to practice the invention 
2 The act established a patent length of ten years, but it was common for applicants to request 
longer protection. Mandich [1936] describes cases in which patent rights lasted 25 and even 
70 years.
3 The Senate was the dominant route for obtaining a patent and alternative routes do not ap-
pear to have played a significant role. Sichelman and O’Connor [2012] suggest that in some cases 
the provveditori di comun could directly award petty patents granting protection limited in dura-
tion and scope which were not a real alternative to the Senate route (on these aspects, see Molà 
[2000]). Data on these minor rights are not available, thus our analysis only focuses on patents 
granted by the Senate.
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and operate in industries controlled by guilds (Mandich [1948]; Sichelman 
and O’Connor [2012]). For example, Florentine inventor Cosmo Scatini was 
granted a patent for high quality black silk dying, which permitted him to 
enroll in the dyers’ guild of Venice (Belfanti [2004]).
Second, guilds were often involved in the patent granting decision process. 
Most of the times, this occurred in the experienza phase when the patentabil-
ity requirements were evaluated. Historians have provided anecdotal evi-
dence of guild opposition. For instance, Trivellato [2008] describes the 
opposition of the Venetian silk spinners’ guild to the patent application of 
Iseppo Giovan Perin Mattiazzo for a new hydraulic mill for spinning and 
throwing silk.4 It is difficult to assess the success rate of guild opposition, 
because Senate records only provide information on patents that were even-
tually granted. Molà [2000] argues that the rejection rate was significant, sug-
gesting that there were more than a thousand applications for the several 
hundred patents granted by the Senate during the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries.
Third, patent holders were expected to share the technology with guild 
members through the payment of an appropriate licensing fee. Such a licens-
ing requirement is often mentioned in the patent records, without specifying 
the precise amount but requesting a ‘discrete sum’ of money for the transfer 
or payment of an ‘adequate reward’ (Berveglieri [1995]).
While a number of historians have examined the administrative details of 
the Venetian patent system and collected detailed information on patent re-
cords, a few studies have addressed the question of why the Senate passed the 
patent act in 1474. Lane [1973] and May [2002] suggest that the growing eco-
nomic and trading power of the Ottoman empire and Antwerp led Venetian 
policy makers to focus on industrial activities. Berveglieri [1995, 1999] and 
Belfanti [2004] emphasize the goal of attracting foreign inventors to the 
Venetian Republic to compensate for the lost supremacy of Venetian guilds 
in various industrial sectors.5 Mandich [1936] argues that successful experi-
mentation with monopolies in mineral rights may have led Venetian authori-
ties to legislate on patent rights. Prager [1952] suggests that it was the 
4 Similarly, Berveglieri [1995] discusses cases of guilds opposing patent applications by foreign 
inventors (e.g., against Flemish inventor Pietro Comans and French inventor Francesco Antola). 
Molà [2000] reports a number of additional opposition cases, such as the 1583 spinning machine 
patent of Urbano Bonturelli and the 1597 silk bleaching patent of Giacomo di Bianchi and 
Innocente Soardo.
5 While some scholars suggest that the aim of the Venetian patent act was to attract foreign 
inventors and improve the human capital of the Republic, the evidence on early patents does not 
seem to be entirely consistent with such a view. As we report below in the paper, Berveglieri 
[1995] finds that only 6.5% of inventors were foreigners – the author classifies as foreigner an 
inventor who was not Italian. A similar finding is in Mandich [1948]: about 15% of inventors 
were not from the Republic of Venice, a share that reduces to less than 5% when we consider as 
foreigner an inventor who was not Italian. This is not to say that the relationship between immi-
gration flows, growth, and innovative activities is not important in other historical contexts (see 
Akcigit et al. [2007a, 2017b] for recent contributions on these issues).
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specificity of Venetian guilds that led the Senate to approve the patent act. 
Compared to other European states, many guilds in Venice were smaller, 
more fragmented and ‘...powerless to grant or to allow monopolies by action 
of their own’ (Prager [1952]: 131). It was therefore the inability of some 
Venetian guilds to secure enough returns to inventors that required monopo-
lies to be issued by the State. Nard and Morris [2006] elaborate on Prager’s 
explanation by adding that a regularized patent system was an effective way 
of increasing commitment toward inventors.6 Our results below are support-
ive of this latter explanation of the approval of the patent act. We find that 
guilds with less monopoly power were the ones that patented more 
intensively.
IV. THEORETICAL MODEL
In this section we develop a simple theoretical model to describe patenting 
incentives in the Venetian Republic. The objective of the theoretical frame-
work is to highlight a few key differences between modern patent regimes and 
the Venetian system and to generate testable predictions on the interaction 
between the Venetian patent law and the guild system.
IV(i). Set-Up
Consider an industry with three firms and two periods t = 1,2. Two firms 
belong to a guild, while the third one is an outsider. In the absence of in-
novation, guild members sell a standard product to consumers. The surplus 
created by the standard product is π per period. We assume that the guild can 
appropriate a fraction α(θ) of this surplus, with 𝛼′(𝜃) > 0. The appropriated 
surplus is shared equally among guild members. The parameter θ captures 
the market power generated by the strength of the guild’s internal statute, 
with a larger value of θ indicating larger collusive power among the members, 
which allows greater profit extraction.
At t = 1, one of the firms develops an innovation that increases the surplus 
to π+Δ per period. Innovations are distributed with cumulative distribution 
F(Δ) with support [0, ∞]. To patent the innovation costs c and patent protec-
tion lasts for one period. The patent grants the innovator the right to extract 
the full surplus for the period. The patent holder negotiates licensing deals 
with the other guild members by making take-it-or-leave-it offers to them. At 
t = 2, once the patent has expired the technology becomes freely available to 
all guild members.
6 Venetian officeholders, also in key positions, held their office only for short periods of time. 
According to Nard and Morris [2006] in such a fluctuating political structure the issuance of 
patents on an ad hoc basis had little commitment power. For this reason a regularized patent 
system was preferred.
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The outsider firm cannot enter the guild without an innovation. Entry is 
guaranteed if  the outsider firm obtains a patent. If  it innovates but does not 
apply for a patent, entry occurs with probability β(θ) with 𝛽′(𝜃) < 0, which 
captures the idea that the stronger guild statutes are, the more difficult it is 
for an outsider to enter.
Before a patent is granted, each guild member can oppose the patent ap-
plication by paying an opposition cost, κ. If  the patent is opposed, the tech-
nology is appropriated and shared among all the guild members during both 
periods. If  the patent of the outsider is opposed, entry to the guild is blocked 
as well.
We solve the game by backward induction, starting from the opposition 
decision. We distinguish two cases, depending on whether the innovation is 
developed by a guild member or by the outsider firm. For simplicity, we set 
α(θ)  =  θ and β(θ)  =  1−θ (we relax this assumption in Section IV(iv)). We 






 to focus on the cases in which the cost of 
obtaining a patent is not too large relative to the baseline surplus and the 
opposition cost.
IV(ii). Patenting by a Guild Member
We first study the case in which the inventor is a guild member. Suppose 
that the innovator applies for a patent and consider the incentives of the 
other guild member to oppose it. If  opposition takes place, the technology 
is shared between the two firms for two periods. Therefore, by choosing to 
oppose the patent, the guild member obtains θ(π+Δ)/2 per period, net of the 
opposition cost, κ.
If  the patent is not opposed, the innovation is freely shared among guild 
members only in the second period, once the patent has expired. In the first 
period, the patentee and the other guild member negotiate a licensing deal 
and the licensee obtains θπ/2, i.e., the status quo profits in the absence of in-
novation.7 Therefore, opposition is profitable if  
which is satisfied if  
7 The implicit assumption here is that in case of disagreement the innovation is not imple-
mented for one period until the patent is expired, so that each firm gets θπ/2. Results are robust 
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< 0, which implies that guild members block patents of 
other guild members more often as their market power increases.
Consider now the innovator’s choice of whether to apply for a patent or 
not. Clearly, if  it anticipates that there will be opposition (i.e., Δ > �Δ(𝜃)), 
then patenting is not profitable. Hence, applying for a patent may be benefi-
cial only when there is no opposition (when Δ≤ Δ̂()). In this case the profits 
of the patentee are equal to 
Specifically, in the first period, patent protection allows the firm to extract 
the full surplus π+Δ. At the same time, the licensing negotiation with the 
other member implies that θπ/2 is transferred through licensing. At t = 2, 
once the patent has expired, the total surplus guild members appropriate re-
duces to θ(π+Δ), and each of them obtains half  of it. When choosing not to 
patent, the innovator obtains θ(π+Δ)/2 in each period because the technology 
is shared starting from t = 1. Therefore, patenting is more profitable than not 
patenting only if  
or 
One can easily verify that, when κ  >  c, then �Δ(𝜃) < �Δ(𝜃).8 Moreover, 
d �Δ(𝜃)
d𝜃
> 0, which implies that as the strength of the internal statute increases, 
guild members patent only their more valuable innovations, i.e., the propen-
sity to patent decreases in θ.
The above discussion implies that the likelihood of patenting goes down 
as the guild’s market power increases because guild members are less likely 
to apply for a patent and more likely to block patents of other members. 




 with a probability equal to 



















8 Formally, �Δ(𝜃) < �Δ(𝜃) when κ > θ[c−π(1−θ)]/(2−θ), a condition which is satisfied when κ > c.
P()=F (Δ̂())−F (Δ̃())
© 2020 The Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
MARKET POWER AND PATENT STRATEGIES: EVIDENCE FROM VENICE 239
IV(iii). Patenting by an External Innovator
Suppose now that the inventor is the outsider firm and consider the opposi-
tion decision. By opposing the patent, a guild member prevents entry of the 
outsider and shares the technology with the other guild member from t = 1, 
obtaining θ(π+Δ)/2 per period net of opposition cost, κ. Without opposi-
tion, a guild member receives a payoff of θπ/2 for one period and shares the 
technology with the other two firms (the other guild member and the external 
innovator) in the second period. Therefore, opposing the patent is more prof-
itable than accommodating entry if  
or 
One can easily check that Δ̂E () is decreasing in θ, i.e., opposition is more 
likely with high θ.9
Similar to what happens with an internal innovator, patenting is profitable 
for the outsider only when there is no opposition (when Δ ≤ Δ̂E ()). In this 
case, by patenting, the external innovator obtains 
In the first period, the innovator extracts the full surplus and strikes licens-
ing deals with the guild members, offering θπ/2 to each of them. In the second 
period, the innovation is shared among the three firms. Without a patent, the 
external innovator enters the guild with probability 1−θ and the technology 
is immediately shared with the guild members. Therefore, patenting is more 
profitable than entering without a patent if  




















9 For simplicity, our focus here is on pure strategy Nash equilibria between the guild members. 
Similar predictions are obtained: (i) in a model in which guild members cooperatively decide 
whether or not to oppose the outsider’s patent, (ii) in a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilib-
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One can easily check that, when π > 3c, �ΔE (𝜃) < 0 for each θ, which implies 
that, absent opposition, the external innovator always patents, no matter the 
strength of the guild statutes.10 Intuitively, for low values of θ, patenting is 
beneficial because the innovator appropriates a large share of the profits gen-
erated by the innovation during the first period. When θ is large, patenting is 
useful to overcome the difficulties of being admitted to the guild.
Therefore, conditional on the outsider’s innovating, the likelihood of pat-
enting is 
which is also decreasing in θ.
IV(iv). Discussion
Our simple model illustrates how the propensity to patent in a technology 
area is affected by the strength of the statutes of the guilds operating in the 
field. As the strength of the statute increases, the market power of a guild goes 
up, and the value of the monopoly rent generated by the patent decreases. 
Thus, guild’s market power reduces the patenting incentives of guild mem-
bers. Moreover, statute strength allows guild members to extract high rents 
from the technologies that they appropriate through patent opposition. This 
implies that, in the presence of strong statutes, patents by guild and non-guild 
members are more likely to be opposed. Together, these two effects generate 
the testable prediction that patenting activity is likely to be less prominent in 
technology fields in which guilds have strong statutes and therefore, high mar-
ket power. Our model also shows that external innovators have stronger incen-
tives to file patent applications when technologies generate very low surplus 
(Δ close to zero). This feature of the model is consistent with the accounts of 
MacLeod [1988] and Belfanti [2006] who describe the attempts of foreigners 
to use patents strategically in order to overcome guild’s entry regulations.
The model builds on a number of assumptions that are worthy of additional 
discussion. First, to obtain a closed form threshold for the patenting and op-
position strategies we set the impact that guild statutes have on rent sharing 
and entry equal to α(θ) = θ and β(θ) = 1−θ. In the online appendix, we show 
that the main predictions are robust to considering more general functions α(θ) 
and β(θ). Specifically, we show that our comparative statics hold under mild as-
sumptions on these functions and derive a sufficient condition that generalizes 
our main results. Second, our baseline setting assumes that the patentee has full 
bargaining power during the licensing negotiations and that it can appropriate 
the whole surplus of the innovation (while the other guild members obtain 
the status-quo profits θπ/2). In the online appendix, we relax this assumption 
10 Assumption π > 3c implies that �Δ
E
(0)= c−𝜋 < 0, �Δ
E
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and study a more general set-up in which the surplus is shared through Nash 
bargaining. We show that our main results are robust, as long as the bargaining 
power of the patentee is not too small. Third, our model shows that innova-
tions generating an intermediate increase in surplus are patented, while innova-
tions with high Δ are not. This feature of the model is driven by the simplifying 
assumption that opposition is always successful. In the online appendix we 
relax this assumption and consider the case in which opposition leads to patent 
rejection only with some probability. In this extension patents are filed also for 
technologies with high surplus, and our main testable prediction still holds: the 
probability that a patent is granted decreases in θ. Finally, our model assumes 
that opposition cannot be avoided through side payments from the patentee to 
guild members. In the online appendix we extend our setting and allow paten-
tees to negotiate with incumbents to avoid opposition, and we show that also 
in this case patenting is less likely for larger values of θ.
A feature of the Venetian patent system highlighted in our model is the op-
portunity for guild members to oppose patent applications. This resembles 
modern administrative processes at the European and United States patent of-
fices (Harhoff and Reitzig [2004]; Hall and Harhoff [2004]). Our simple model 
suggests that these opposition systems may have a variety of effects on entry 
and patenting behavior. On the one hand, opposition allows incumbent firms 
to screen out inefficient patenting by external innovators (i.e., technologies with 
Δ < c). On the other hand, opposition allows non-innovating incumbents to 
protect their short and long-term rents, which creates an incentive to block entry 
and oppose efficient technologies. This trade-off suggests that a well-designed 
opposition system needs to balance screening and rent-preservation incentives.
V. DATA AND METHODS
Our empirical analysis combines data on craft guilds active in the Venetian 
Republic during the Renaissance with information on the patents granted by 
the Venetian Senate during this period.
Our main source of data on craft guilds is the dataset Istituzioni Corporative, 
Gruppi Professionali e Forme Associative del Lavoro nell’Italia Moderna e 
Contemporanea (Istituzioni Corporative, henceforth) which is the outcome of a 
research project financed by the Italian Ministry for Education, Universities 
and Research involving a variety of leading history departments across multiple 
Italian universities. The goal of the project was to release a dataset with detailed 
information on the universe of Italian guilds for the period 1400-1700.11
11 The researchers start from the sample of 73 Italian cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants 
in 1300, and successfully retrieve information on guilds for 50 of these cities (no data were avail-
able for smaller cities in southern Italy, where the economy was predominantly based on agricul-
ture). The final dataset comprises more than 1,000 guilds active in Italy during the period 
1400-1700. Guilds for which researchers were not able to retrieve enough information are miss-
ing from the sample - these are likely to be smaller institutions of little economic importance. A 
comprehensive description (in Italian) of the data is provided in Moioli [2004].
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Key variables include the name of each guild, the time period of its activ-
ity, and its geographical location. The data provide a detailed description of 
the manufacturing operations and trading activities of each guild. The data-
set also reports a variety of indicators related to the internal organization of 
the guild, such as the presence of restrictions on market competition or the 
existence of a structured apprenticeship system.
Our analysis focuses on 340 craft guilds identified in Istituzioni Corporative 
as active in the Venetian Republic before 1600. Costantini [1987] estimates that 
at the end of the 16th century Venetian guilds included about 34,000 members, 
which was roughly 20 per cent of the population and about half of the econom-
ically active labor force. The guilds in our sample capture a large fraction of the 
European economic activity at that time, because Venice was the third largest 
city in Europe and a leading international trading center (Pezzolo [2013]).
The books by Berveglieri [1995, 1999] are our main data sources on 
Venetian patents, as they report information on the patent rights granted 
by the senate and retrieved from the state Archives of Venice. Berveglieri’s 
work extends previous research by Mandich [1936], [1948], who classified 
and translated into modern Italian 109 Venetian patents for the period 
1474-1550. For the same period, Berveglieri [1995] identifies 169 patents. The 
first panel of Appendix Table A-I shows the technological breakdown of 
these patents: mills account for roughly half  of the inventions, followed by 
drainage devices (11 per cent), and hydraulic pumps (7 per cent). Interestingly, 
these higher patenting rates in manufacturing and agricultural machinery are 
strikingly similar with those observed by Moser [2012] in her study of British 
and American innovations at world’s fairs between 1851 and 1951.
For each guild in our sample, we identify the patents involving technolo-
gies related to the guild’s activity. To manually match guilds with patents we 
exploit the detailed description of each guild’s manufacturing operations 
provided in Istituzioni Corporative, and the patent technology classification 
provided by Berveglieri [1995].12
Two things need to be noted here. First, patents can be assigned to multiple 
guilds. For example, a patent covering a new type of sawmill is assigned to all guilds 
whose activities involve the use of sawmills. This approach is consistent with our 
model and captures a crucial feature of the Venetian patent system: a patent al-
lowed the patentee to enter each of the guilds that could use the technology. In fact, 
a sawmill patent permitted the inventor to enter all the guilds that used sawmills 
and, at the same time, each of these guilds was entitled to oppose the patent.13
12 We drop patents related to inventions that cannot be easily imputed to a guild in our sample 
(e.g., perpetual motion). In Section VI(ii) we discuss alternative empirical approaches that ex-
ploit all the patents in Berveglieri’s sample.
13 Moreover, Berveglieri [1995] does not provide information on the specific location and ori-
gin of the patentee, he only indicates whether the patentee was a foreigner or not. For the smaller 
sample of patents described in Mandich [1936], [1948] we have information on geographical 
scope of the patent, i.e., in some cases the patentee could only enter guilds of specific cities. We 
exploit this information in a robustness exercise in Section VI(iii).
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Second, our matching procedure does not imply a one-to-one mapping 
between the sector in which the guild operates and the patents assigned to the 
guild. This is because the description of guild activities in Istituzioni 
Corporative shows that guilds belonging to the same sector (and usually shar-
ing the same denomination) often carried out different sets of manufacturing 
activities. Take, for example, the fabbri (blacksmiths’) guilds scattered across 
the various cities in our sample. Some of these guilds produced armours and 
weapons, whereas others produced keys, locks or other metal products. To 
account for these differences, we impute armour and weapons patents only to 
the relevant subset of blacksmiths’ guilds. Similarly, a fraction of the biavar-
oli (corn traders’) guilds owned mills to produce flour, but a number of them 
were only involved in trading activities. Also in this case we assigned cere-
al-mills patents only to the guilds using such technologies.14
The main variables used in the empirical analysis are described below. 
Patents. This is the endogenous variable in the analysis. It captures the num-
ber of patents granted by the Venetian Senate from 1474 to 1550 in the primary 
technological field of the guild. While Berveglieri [1995] reports patents for a 
longer period, our main analysis focuses on patenting for the period 1474-1550 
to avoid the 1575-76 plague, which had a profound impact on the Venetian 
economy. Pezzolo [2013] documents the large demographic effects of the plague, 
with an estimated decrease in population of between 15 and 26 per cent. In 
Section VI(ii) we show that our results are robust to using patents granted up to 
1600. Appendix Figure A-1 describes the evolution of patenting over time.15
Guided by the work of historians, we construct a variable capturing the 
strength of guild statutes. A number of statutes in our sample include re-
strictions on competition, such as price fixing, minimum distance between 
workshops (botteghe) or a ban on serving customers of other guild members. 
Granting privileges to sons and sons-in-law of members was a typical way to 
restrict entry of local potential competitors (Moioli [2004]). In some cases, 
such as the goldsmith guild of Venice, entry was completely precluded to 
those who were not descendents of guild members. In other statutes, entry 
fees or exams were required for those who were not sons of guild members. 
To preclude the entry of foreigners, various statutes included additional pro-
visions targeting all foreigners, or specific ethnic groups. This leads us to gen-
erate the following variable.
Strong internal regulation. This dummy variable is equal to one if  the guild 
has internal rules that: (i) limit competition among the members, (ii) grant 
14 There is also large variation in patenting across the molineri (millers) guilds. In fact, some of 
these guilds specialized in textile production, others ground grains into flour, others cut wood, 
etc. In the construction of this variable we restrict each guilds to a primary technology area 
among those provided by Berveglieri [1995], but we confirmed that results are robust to using 
less restrictive mappings when guilds’ activities spanned multiple technology areas.
15 We confirmed this pattern with our alternative patent data from Mandich [1936].
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entry privileges to sons of guild members, and (iii) restrict entry rights of 
foreigners.
It is likely that all guilds operating in the Venetian Republic adopted some 
formal or informal restriction to limit competition and entry. Thus, one has 
table i  
Summary StatiStiCS
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel (a): Summary statistics at the guild level
Patents 340 1.47 5.10 0 42
Strong internal regulation 340 0.21 0.40 0 1
Distance 340 59.9 77.67 0 422.10
Trade guild 340 0.46 0.49 0 1
Guild members 169 164.06 392.27 2 3390
Num. of guilds Patents per guild
Panel (b): Statutory strength and patenting at the sector level
Macro-sectors with low level of aver-
age strength of internal statutes 
(below 0.18)
Food (production and retail) 42 1.57
Wood and paper 11 0.82
Transportation and drainage of canals 67 0.52
Miscellanea 32 0.22
Macro-sectors with intermediate level 
of average strength of internal 
statutes (0.18 - 0.30)
Metals 28 0.61
Shipbuilding 9 0.44
Textile and clothing 73 0.38
Retail (other than food) 16 0
Macro-sectors with high level of 
average strength of internal statutes 
(above 0.30)
Construction 14 0.21
Glass making 7 0
Barbers and apothecaries 13 0
Leather products 28 0
Notes: Panel (a) Unit of observation is a guild i located in city j. Patents is the total number of patents granted 
from 1474 to 1550 in the technology sector of the guild. Distance= distance from Venice in km. Strong inter-
nal regulation = 1 if  guild has internal rules which restrict competition, grant privileges to sons of members, 
and restrict rights of foreign members. Trade guild =1 if  the guild is not involved in manufacturing. Guild 
members = number of registered members as reported in the Istituzioni Corporative data.
Panel (b). Num. of guilds is the number of guilds classified in the sector following the Istituzioni Corporative 
data. Patents per guild is the average number of patents of the guilds belonging to the sector.
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to interpret Strong internal regulation as capturing guilds for which historians 
have identified statutory provisions that generate greater market power by 
being more severe than those of other guilds in the sample.16
We now introduce some of the other control variables to be used in our 
empirical analysis.
Distance to Venice. This variable captures the distance (in kilometres) be-
tween the city of the guild and Venice. We construct this measure by exploit-
ing a variety of historical maps describing the most important transportation 
routes in the Venetian Republic in the period of our study. These include the 
Atlantic Map of  the state Archive of Venice and various maps in Lanaro 
Sartori [1985] illustrating trade routes in the Venetian Republic.
Trade Guild. This dummy equals one for guilds that are only involved in 
trade (including transportation and financial services) and not in manufac-
turing. Roughly 46 per cent of the guilds in our sample are trade guilds.
Guild Members. This information is available only for 169 guilds. On aver-
age, guilds in our sample have 164 members (with median equal to 48 and a 
standard deviation of 392).
Table 1 provides summary statistics. Panel A shows that on average, there 
are 1.47 patents in the main technology field in which a guild operates, with 
a standard deviation of roughly five patents. About 21 per cent of the guilds 
in our data have strong internal regulation. In Panel B, guilds are aggregated 
into 12 macro-sectors based on the classification in the Istituzioni Corporative 
database. The table highlights a negative relationship between patenting and 
statute strength: macro-sectors with higher average value in the strong inter-
nal regulation variable show a lower patenting propensity as measured by the 
number of patents per guild.
Additional information on guilds is presented in the second panel of 
Appendix Table A-I. The table illustrates the geographical distribution of the 
guilds across the ten cities of the Venetian Republic in our sample. Roughly 
50 per cent of the guilds are located in Venice. Verona, Padua, and Brescia 
are the cities with more guilds in the mainland (Terraferma).
V(i). Econometric Specification
Building on the theoretical analysis of Section IV, our main economet-
ric model focuses on the relationship between our measure of patenting, 
Patentsij , related to guild i located in city j and the indicator for the strength 
16 Unfortunately, the Istituzioni Corporative dataset describes the exact statutory provision for 
only a small subset of guilds. For most guilds, the information is available only as a dummy (i.e., 
restriction to competition? Y/N; Privileges to sons? Y/N, etc…). This is the main reason why our 
empirical analysis exploits these binary variables.
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of internal regulation of the guild. We typically model the conditional expec-
tation of patenting activity as 
where xij is a vector of guild-specific control variables and j is a city-specific 
idiosyncratic effect. The log-link formulation is appropriate in our setting 
because of the non-negative and highly skewed nature of our count-based 
dependent variable.
Following a long-standing tradition in the economics of innovation litera-
ture (Hausman et al. [1984]), we estimate this model via Poisson, with robust 
standard errors to account for over-dispersion. Consistency of the Poisson 
estimates is guaranteed as long as the mean of the dependent variable is cor-
rectly specified (Gourieroux et al. [1984]).17
The coefficient α captures the relationship between statutory provisions 
restricting entry and competition and patenting in the technology area of the 
guild. When α < 0 strong statutes are associated with lower patenting, which 
is the prediction of our theoretical model. A finding of α = 0 would indicate 
that statutory clauses generating market power are not associated with pat-
enting in the technology area. When α > 0 we would conclude that patenting 
is more frequent in technology areas in which guilds have strong statutes.
In principle, the regression coefficient α captures the combined effect of 
statutory clauses on innovation investments as well as on the propensity to 
use patents to protect technologies. However, our reading of the history lit-
erature cautions us to interpret α as capturing the relationship between in-
novation and statutory clauses. This is because the novelty content of the 
patents was evaluated on the basis of the knowledge available in the Venetian 
dominion and patents could involve technologies already available elsewhere 
(Molà [2014]). Moreover, historians have documented substantial innova-
tion activity occurring outside the patent system. For example, Moser [2012] 
shows that 89 per cent of the technologies presented at the 1851 World Fair 
in London were not patented. The extent of non-patented innovation is likely 
to have been even larger during the first few decades of the Venetian patent 
system. This is supported by a variety of anecdotal evidence illustrating a 
considerable amount of innovations by guilds for which we observe little pat-
enting. For example, Molà [2007] describes a vibrant innovation activity in 
the soap-boiler guilds which developed a variety of new products during the 
period of our study. Yet, there are no patents related to these technologies in 
our data. Similarly, Caniato [1996] and Trivellato [2008] describe substantial 
innovation activity for the Arsenal and Murano’s glassblowers which are also 
guilds for which we observe very little patenting.
E(Patentsij) = exp (Strong internal regulationij+xij +j)
17 We confirm the robustness of our baseline results with alternative clustering of the standard 
errors at the city and the guild level.
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Overall, these studies suggest that α speaks more to the propensity 
to use patents to protect technologies than to the propensity to innovate. 
Highlighting the link between market power and patent strategies has im-
portant implications for the empirical literature that typically measures in-
novation with patent counts. Patent based measures of innovation activity 
may over-estimate or under-estimate innovation effects when the variable 




Table II provides the first set of results. The regressions show a strong nega-
tive association between the patents granted in the technology field of a guild 
and the strength of its internal rules. All regressions include a control for 
trade guilds, which indicates substantially lower patenting activity for this 
type of organization. In column 2 we control for the geographic distance 
between the city in which a guild is located and Venice. The likelihood of 
patenting increases with the distance from Venice, and the coefficient on in-
ternal regulation remains stable. Column 3 shows that the relationship be-
tween guild statute strength and patenting is robust to the inclusion of city 
fixed effects. Exponentiation of the coefficient implies that patenting is 
roughly 65 per cent lower when guilds adopt strong internal regulation. In 
column 4 we show that results are similar when we control for the number of 
guild members, even if  this restricts the analysis to a much smaller sample. 
The coefficient on the number of members is positive (but statistically insig-
nificant), suggesting that patenting is more frequent in technology fields 
where guilds are larger.18
Overall, the results in Table II document a negative correlation between 
patenting and statutory provisions limiting entry and competition, which is 
consistent with our theoretical model.
VI(ii). Robustness and Extensions
We perform a variety of additional empirical tests to confirm the robustness 
of our main finding. First, we show that the estimates of the strength of in-
ternal regulation and of geographical distance are unaffected once we 
18 In unreported regressions we capture guilds with a large number of members with a dummy 
variable equal to one if  the number of members is above the top quintile (180 members). In such 
specifications the dummy is positive and statistically significant at the 0.1 level, supporting the 
idea that patenting is more likely in fields where guilds have many members. We also examined 
whether there are heterogeneous effects of statutory strength between smaller and larger guilds 
but we do not find any supporting evidence.
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include additional controls for city characteristics. In column 1 of Appendix 
Table A-II we show robustness to the inclusion of controls for the size of the 
city measured with population in 1300, 1400, and 1500 (data from Malanima 
[1998]). Interestingly, population controls do not appear to explain much of 
the variance in patenting activity, suggesting that the number of patents is 
not simply driven by city size. In a model with city effects, column 2 of 
Appendix Table A-II shows that the negative correlation between strength of 
the statute and patenting is robust to including a variety of additional con-
trols for guild characteristics, such as the age of the guild (in 1600) and a 
dummy for the presence of an apprenticeship system.19 The regression also 
includes industry effects for guilds in agriculture, construction, and textile. In 
column 3 of Appendix Table A-II we expand the time period considering the 
patenting activity up to 1600. For this longer time window the patent dataset 
expands substantially including now 640 patent rights. The estimates show 
that our findings are robust to using this alternative dependent variable. 
Column 4 shows that results are robust to including a dummy for guilds 
whose operations require the use of mills. While the magnitude of the coef-
ficient on Strong internal regulation drops by about one quarter, the correla-
tion remains negative and statistically significant, indicating that our results 
are not exclusively driven by patents related to mills.
19 De la Croix et al. [2016] discuss how apprenticeship was a key determinant of knowledge 
transfer and economic growth in Medieval cities.
table ii  
Guild internal reGulation and patentinG
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Patents Patents Patents Patents
Strong internal regulation −0.750*** −0.995*** −1.133*** −1.717***
(0.151) (0.103) (0.439) (0.610)
log (Distance) 0.224***
(0.026)
log (Guild members) 0.256
(0.191)
Trade guild −4.535*** −4.357*** −4.355*** −5.268***
(0.710) (0.708) (0.848) (1.042)
City Effects No No Yes Yes
Observations 340 340 340 169
Notes: Poisson estimation with robust standard errors. * significant at 10 per cent, ** significant at 5 per cent 
and *** significant at 1 per cent. Strong internal regulation = 1 if  guild has internal rules which restrict com-
petition, grant privileges to sons of members, and restrict rights of foreign members. Distance = distance from 
Venice in km. Guild members = number of registered members as reported in the Istituzioni Corporative data. 
Trade guild = 1 if  the guild is not involved in manufacturing.
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There is the concern that the effect of  statutory norms on patenting 
is not driven by specific provisions related to entry and competition, but 
by other statutory rules. Specifically, the reader may worry that Strong 
internal regulation simply captures statutes that are very detailed, and that 
some other rule in these statutes may affect patenting more than those 
related to entry and competition. To address this concern, we perform a 
number of  placebo tests, constructing variables that identify statutes con-
taining detailed regulations of  guild activities not directly related to entry 
and competition. For example, in column 5 of  Appendix Table A-II the 
variable Placebo equals one if  the statute includes: (i) a list of  manufac-
turing activities precluded to women, (ii) the name of  the guild’s patron 
saint, and (iii) a description of  the hierarchical structure of  the guild. 
The coefficient on this variable is positive, statistically insignificant, and 
small in magnitude. We obtain similar estimates (positive, small, and sta-
tistically insignificant) with alternative placebo tests that exploit various 
combinations of  the above variables and other statutory clauses, such as 
the presence of  an apprenticeship system, or of  technical restrictions on 
the quality of  the products. These findings support the idea that patent-
ing propensity is strongly related to provisions in guild statutes restricting 
entry and competition, but not to other statutory rules.
One may also be concerned about changes in statutory clauses over time. Two 
things need to be noted here. First, Istituzioni Corporative typically relies on 
documents that are contemporaneous with the patent act (Moioli [2004]). 
Second, historians have emphasized how changes in guild statutes over time 
typically led to lower entry barriers and greater competition (Costantini [1987]). 
This implies that in constructing Strong internal regulation we are more likely to 
classify as strong, statutes that are not strong, and that measurement error will 
bias our estimates toward zero. While the dataset provides information on 
whether the statute of a guild changes over time, we do not know the exact 
clauses that are affected by the change, which precludes us from using the longi-
tudinal nature of the data. Nonetheless, we exploit this information to perform 
robustness tests. Specifically, we identify statutes that changed during the period 
1474-1550. In roughly 81 per cent of the sample there was no statutory change 
during the time period, for about 18 per cent of the guilds the statute was 
changed once, and for the remaining 1 per cent it was changed twice. In column 
6 of Table A-II we show that our baseline estimates are robust to dropping 
guilds that change their statutes during our sample period. The coefficient is 
roughly 15 per cent larger than our baseline, confirming the idea that measure-
ment error biases our estimates toward zero.20
Our results may be driven by differences in patenting and guild structure 
between Venice and other cities in the Republic. In particular, one may 
20 We confirm this result in regressions: (i) that include a control for statutory changes, and (ii) 
consider changes over different time windows.
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worry that international competition can lead some of  the most promi-
nent guilds of  the city of  Venice to reach the technology frontier, and this 
may affect their patenting strategies. To examine this issue, column 1 of 
Appendix Table A-III drops from the sample the guilds located in Venice. 
Addressing similar concerns, column 2 of  Appendix Table A-III drops 
the guilds involved in trade. For both of  these exercises the sample size 
drops roughly 40 per cent, but the negative relationship between statutory 
strength and patenting is robust, with statistically significant coefficients 
and stable magnitude.
Columns 3 and 4 of Appendix Table A-III examine the robustness of our 
findings to using two alternative approaches to measure statutory strength. 
Column 3 replaces the Strong internal regulation dummy with a Statutory 
strength index which is set equal to 2 for statutes restricting both entry and 
competition, equal to 1 for statutes restricting only entry or only competition 
and equal to 0 for the other statutes. The estimated coefficient confirms the 
negative association between statutory strength and patenting. Building on 
this approach, column 4 includes three separate dummies, one for statutes 
limiting entry, one for statutes limiting competition, and the Strong internal 
regulation dummy which can be interpreted as the interaction between the 
two previous dummies. The estimates suggest that the negative association 
with patenting appears to be driven by guilds for which both types of statu-
tory restrictions are jointly present, i.e., by the guilds with the most restrictive 
statutes. This finding is partly driven by the high degree of correlation be-
tween restrictions to entry and competition that we observe in the guilds’ 
statutes. Most of the times in which statutes implement entry barriers, they 
also include limits to competition. This suggests that the variation required 
to identify the differential effects of entry barriers from those of limits to 
competition may not be present in our data.21
In our baseline analysis the unit of observation is a guild. This approach is 
consistent with our theoretical framework and allows us to fully exploit the 
richness of the Istituzioni Corporative dataset. As an alternative approach, in 
Appendix Table A-IV we show that our main findings are robust to conduct-
ing the analysis at the industry level. Specifically, we assign each of the guilds 
of our sample to one of 51 unique industrial sectors exploiting the descrip-
tion of the guild activities in Istituzioni Corporative. We also assign each of 
the 169 patents in Berveglieri [1995] to one of these sectors. These regressions 
confirm the negative effect of strong statutes on patenting. The larger the 
fraction of guilds with strong internal regulation the lower the number of 
21 In fact, while nearly 60 per cent of the statutes restrict competition and one quarter imple-
ment barriers to entry, in only a few cases (12 out of 340) statutes restrict entry but not compe-
tition. We also construct an alternative statutory strength index ranging from 0 to 3, depending 
on the number of restrictions to entry and competition imposed by the statute. In a series of 
unreported regressions, we find that the association between this alternative index and patenting 
is non-linear confirming the idea that the effect is driven by the most stringent statutes.
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patents for the industrial sector. The implied elasticity is −0.6, a magnitude 
which is in line with our baseline estimates of Table II. This robustness test 
also confirms the positive correlation between patenting in the technology 
field and average distance of the guilds from Venice.22
In addition, the regressions in Appendix Table A-IV show a negative cor-
relation between the number of guilds active in a sector and the patenting 
activity in that sector. We confirmed this finding in (unreported) regressions 
at the guild level by including a control for the number of active guilds in the 
guild’s technology area. The negative coefficients support the idea that the 
likelihood of patent opposition increases as the number of guilds that can 
oppose the patent gets larger. This finding also mitigates the concern that 
patents were more widespread in technology areas where multiple guilds were 
active and that patentees could coordinate competition across guilds through 
licensing.23
Finally, in unreported regressions we confirm the robustness of our main 
findings to estimating alternative econometric specifications, such as OLS, 
zero-inflated Poisson and a linear probability model for the presence of at 
least one patent for the guild.
VI(iii). Foreign Inventors and Alternative Patent Data
We turn next to two extensions that are of independent interest. First, we 
examine whether the determinants of patenting differ between local and for-
eign inventors. We obtain information on the origin of the innovators from 
Berveglieri [1995] who describes patents of foreign inventors and provides 
some information on their histories and business activities. Specifically, 
Berveglieri [1995] classifies an inventor as foreign if  he is not Italian and 
shows that only 6.5 per cent of the patents in the sample were granted to 
foreign inventors. Importantly, the accounts in Berveglieri suggest that these 
foreign inventors did not belong to any guild before their patent applica-
tion, so this sample only includes external innovators. Conversely, patent-
ing by the other, non-foreign, inventors (we label them as ‘local’ in Table III) 
is likely to include both patenting by guild members and patenting by 
external inventors. Exploiting these data, columns 1 to 4 of Table III  
22 Few of the patents relate to inventions which cannot be easily imputed to only one sector 
(e.g., inventions related to perpetual motion). These patents are assigned to the sectors in pro-
portion to the patenting propensity of each sector. Similarly, patents related to mills with multi-
ple usages are imputed to sectors in which mills are used, proportionally to their sector-specific 
patents. Table A-IV confirms that the results are robust to dropping these patents from the 
sample. Results are also similar in Poisson regressions where observations are weighted by the 
number of guilds active in the sector.
23 The history literature confirms the idea that cooperative interactions across guilds were ex-
tremely rare. Markets were mostly local, guild members were strongly embedded in their city and 
multiple memberships to guilds of different cities were not permitted (Caracausi [2008]; Olgivie 
[2014]).
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show statistically significant associations between geographical distance and 
strength of internal rules for patenting both of local and of foreign inventors. 
The magnitude of these correlations is much smaller for foreign inventors. 
Nonetheless, our estimates show that the characteristics of the city and the 
guild seem to affect patenting propensity of inventors independently of their 
origin. It is possible to reconcile the larger magnitude of the effect for local 
inventors with our theoretical model. In fact, under standard assumptions 
on the distribution of the parameter Δ (e.g. uniform, exponential, etc.) the 
derivative of the probability of patenting with respect to θ has a smaller mag-
nitude for external innovators than for guild members.
Second, we examine the relationship between statutory clauses and pat-
enting, exploiting a different source of patent data. Specifically, rather than 
matching guilds and patents using the data and the technology classification 
of Berveglieri [1995, 1999], we construct a new dependent variable that relies 
on the patents collected and described by Mandich [1936]. Interestingly, this 
smaller sample also includes information on the geographical scope of patent 
rights. Even though the wording of the 1474 act indicates that patents were 
enforceable in the entire dominion, about 12 per cent of the patents described 
in Mandich [1936] appear enforceable only in specific locations (e.g., only in 
Venice or other specific cities). We use this information to construct an alter-
native measure of patenting that imputes patents with limited geographical 
scope only to the guilds located in the relevant cities. Columns 5 and 6 show 
that our results on the geographical distance and on the strength of internal 
rules are robust to exploiting this alternative data source.
VII. INSTRUMENTING GUILDS’ REGULATION STRENGTH
Our analysis has shown a strong negative association between the strength 
of a guild’s internal rules and patenting in the technology area in which the 
guild operates, which is consistent with the predictions of our theoretical 
framework. We have documented robustness of this finding in a variety of 
specifications that include city effects and control for several guild character-
istics. But still, to interpret this result causally is challenging, because unob-
servable variables may be correlated both with Strong internal regulation and 
with patenting.
In particular, there are two alternative explanations that need to be ad-
dressed. First, guilds with strong statutes may be more likely to operate in 
technology areas in which secrecy can be used more effectively and there is 
less need for patents. Specifically, the concern is that Strong internal regula-
tion is spuriously correlated with low information leakages, which would 
imply that our estimates do not capture the effect of statutory clauses re-
stricting market power. Our industry controls partially address this concern, 
because information leakages are likely to be similar for guilds operating 
within the same industry. Moreover, one would expect guilds facing high 
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information leakages to be more likely to adopt clauses to restrict entry, 
which would generate a positive rather than a negative correlation between 
patenting and Strong internal regulation.24
Second, the 1474 patent act may have been introduced as a response to 
technology shocks affecting guilds without strong statutes, or as a political 
move to curb the power of stronger guilds. There are two reasons why we 
think this is unlikely. First, one would expect the Venetian government to 
react to technology shocks in specific industries with targeted policies rather 
than with a one-size-fits-all patent act affecting all the guilds in the domin-
ion (we describe examples of such targeted policies in Section VII). Second, 
senatorial records show that the act passed with a very large majority (116 
votes in favor, 10 against, and 3 abstentions), which is inconsistent with a 
politically contentious act harming powerful guilds (Berveglieri [1995]).
Addressing these issues and other unobservable heterogeneity concerns 
more constructively requires an instrumental variable correlated with the 
presence of statutory norms restricting entry and competition and uncor-
related with patenting strategies. In this section, we propose an instrument 
that relies on the religious origin of some of the guilds in our sample.
A number of the guilds active in the Venetian Republic during the 
Renaissance find their origin in religious confraternities that arose from the 
spread of the Flagellant movement during the 13th century. A confraternity 
(also called ‘scola’ or ‘fratalea’) was an association of lay people driven by 
Christian devotion and works of charity (Gasparini [1987]). While people 
from all social classes could join a confraternity, most of the members were 
craftsmen. Confraternity members were required to follow rules and bylaws 
in exchange for help in times of hardship and the security of a good funeral 
(Monticolo [1896]; Pullan [1971]).
During the 14th and 15th centuries the Venetian government promoted the 
formation of craft and trade guilds as a way to collect tax revenue and to re-
cruit soldiers, and this led members of confraternities to set up craft guilds 
linked to the various confraternities (Costantini [1987]; Gasparini [1987]). 
For example, in Venice the guild of ironmongers was connected to the con-
fraternity of San Lorenzo, fishermen with that of San Nicolò, and goldsmiths 
with San Mattio’s (Mackenney [1994]).25
Istituzioni Corporative shows that roughly 30 per cent of the guilds in our 
sample originated from a religious confraternity. There is no clear pattern 
linking the religious origin of guilds with their geographic location or their 
24 At the time of our study, knowledge circulation was closely linked with circulation of peo-
ple, and enforcement of trade secrets required restrictions to guild access and cooperation be-
tween members. Therefore, in our model one can interpret the larger surplus appropriation from 
an increase in θ as capturing both greater market power and lower information leakage.
25 These connections generated obligations on both sides. For example, guilds were required to 
make financial contributions to the confraternity, but were also allowed to use the confraternity 
venues as meeting places.
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industry. For example, the barbers’ guild in Verona originated from a confra-
ternity, but none of the barber guilds in the other cities in the sample have 
religious origins. Similarly, the blacksmiths’ guild of Udine is linked to a con-
fraternity, whereas those of Padua, Venice and Vicenza are not.
More than half  of the guilds in Venice are linked to a confraternity, whereas 
in the other cities the proportion is typically below 20 per cent. Nonetheless, 
once we control for city effects, we do not find any significant correlation 
between the religious origin of the guild and other observable characteristics, 
such as its age, the presence of an apprenticeship system, or the industry. 
Table A-V in the appendix illustrates this result in a series of regressions in 
which religious origin is the dependent variable. In all cases the correlations 
are close to zero and statistically insignificant. These results support the idea 
that the religious origin of a guild is likely to be driven by idiosyncratic rea-
sons related to the local success of the Flagellant movement centuries before 
the patent act, and thus unlikely to be correlated with shocks affecting pat-
enting strategies after 1474.
Historians also documented how religious confraternities followed a strict 
set of rules – which were recorded in a book called Mariegola – regulating 
both admission of new members and day-to-day interactions among mem-
bers (Monticolo [1892, 1896]; Gasparini [1987]; Black [1989]). Black [1989] 
describes how admission of new individuals involved serious scrutiny by the 
confraternity’s leading officials and, in some cases, it required a vote of the 
whole congregation and the payment of an entrance fee. Statutes of guilds 
that originated from confraternities were often inspired by the Mariegolas of 
the related confraternities (Mackenney [1994]). Moreover, entry restrictions 
may have been required to limit access to the public good provided by the as-
sociated confraternity (Greif  and Tabellini [2017]). This suggests that guilds 
with religious origin were more likely to adopt internal rules restricting entry 
and competition.
In Table IV we exploit the linkages between guilds and confraternities as 
instrumental variable. Column 1 reports the first stage regression, which in-
dicates a strong positive correlation between the religious origin of the guild 
and the strength of its internal rules. Columns 2 and 3 contrast the OLS esti-
mates and the 2SLS estimates of similar linear regression models. Both spec-
ifications confirm the strong negative relationship between patenting and the 
guild’s internal rules. The estimates of the IV regression are larger in magni-
tude but not statistically different from those in the OLS model. The larger 
magnitude of the coefficient is consistent with measurement error in statu-
tory strength biasing the estimates toward zero, as discussed above.26
26 We obtain qualitatively similar results with an IV Poisson model, but our estimates are much 
larger in this case. We also experience convergence issues with some specifications of the IV 
Poisson model, which are common for this estimator, as described in Silva and Tenreyro [2011].
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Following Galasso et al. [2013], we also instrument Strong internal regula-
tion with the predicted probability of a strong statute obtained from a probit 
model in which the endogenous variable is regressed on the instrument and 
other first-stage covariates. When the endogenous regressor is a dummy, this 
estimator is asymptotically efficient in the class of estimators where instru-
ments are a function of the religious origin of the guild and other covariates 
(Wooldridge [2002]). The 2SLS estimate with this alternative model is essen-
tially identical in magnitude and of stronger statistical significance than the 
one presented in column 3 of Table IV.27
While the vast majority of  the guilds in our sample were formed in the 
14th and 15th centuries, there is the possibility that for some of  the oldest 
guilds in our sample confraternity and guild developed side by side. For 
these observations, the exogeneity of  our instrument may be questionable 
because unobservable factors may have driven the joint formation of  the 
confraternities and the guild. To address the concern that the oldest guilds 
are not biasing our estimates, in column 1 of  Appendix Table A-VI we 
show that our IV estimates are robust to including more flexible controls 
for age of  the guild, i.e., separate dummies for each age quartile. To fur-
ther capture idiosyncratic features of  the oldest guilds, in column 2 we add 
an extra dummy for guilds above 95th percentile of  the age distribution. 
27 Following Angrist and Pischke [2009], we exploit the first stage estimates to compute the 
proportion of the treated who are compliers which is 0.22. This indicates that our estimates are 
not specific to a small compliant subpopulation.
table iv  
reliGiouS ConfraternitieS and Guild internal StrenGth













Strong internal regulation −1.958** −4.183* −4.387**
(0.861) (2.720) (2.191)
City Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 340 340 340 340
First stage F-test 7.85 13.21
Instrument Religious confraternity Probit regression
Notes: OLS estimation with robust standard errors. * significant at 10 per cent, ** significant at 5 per cent and 
*** significant at 1 per cent. All regressions include a dummy for Trade guilds. Religious confraternity = 1 if  
guild is linked to a religious institution. Strong internal regulation = 1 if  guild has internal rules which restrict 
competition, grant privileges to sons of members, and restrict rights of foreign members. In column 4 IV is 
predicted value from probit regression as in Wooldridge [2002].
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Column 3 drops these old guilds altogether. Across the three columns we 
find strong, negative and statistically significant coefficients confirming 
the robustness of  our estimates.
VII(i). Religious Origin and Innovation Incentives
Our IV strategy rests on the assumption that the religious origins of  guilds 
are not related to anything that affects patenting a few centuries in the fu-
ture, save stronger admission requirements to enter these guilds. One con-
cern is that religion also has a direct impact on patenting. For instance, 
members of  guilds with a religious origin may be more risk averse, i.e., 
less likely to implement changes in their statutes and business practices, 
and therefore less likely to use patents internally and more likely to oppose 
patents of  external innovators. Using modern data on religiosity across 
countries and the U.S. States, Bénabou, Ticchi and Vindigni [2015] provide 
support for such a negative effect of  religion on innovation, document-
ing a negative correlation between religiosity and patenting, which suggests 
a lower propensity to adopt new ideas and embrace change. This finding 
is confirmed by Squicciarini [2019] but only for more modern times. The 
author exploits data on 19th-century France to examine the impact of  re-
ligion on knowledge diffusion. She finds that religion was detrimental to 
knowledge diffusion only during the second industrial revolution when the 
Catholic Church was promoting an anti-scientific program against techni-
cal schools. Interestingly, religion had no effect in earlier periods, suggest-
ing that the link between innovation and religiosity started to matter only 
in more modern times. While we cannot rule out the possibility of  a direct 
negative effect of  religion on innovation and patenting, there are a number 
of  reasons why we do not expect this channel to play an important role in 
our setting, in line with Squicciarini [2019].
First, the religious confraternities that spread throughout Northern Italy 
in the Middle Ages represented a novel and more modern way of practicing 
the Christian faith. They placed more emphasis on the individual role and 
less emphasis on the role of the church and the clergy (Black [1989]). Their 
laity, openness to women, and diversity in social composition are evidence of 
these modern attitudes (Gasparini [1987]). These confraternities also had an 
important educational role, which led to more openness in the ideas of their 
members, liberating many from superstition and profound ignorance (Black 
[1989]). They also improved literacy rates and generated more debate about 
religious beliefs, which provided the foundation for the subsequent Catholic 
reform.
Second, risk taking and individual entrepreneurship were not discouraged 
by confraternities. Often, confraternities provided loans to their members, on 
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the security of pledged goods, charging minimal interest to cover administra-
tive costs. Moreover, confraternities benefitted from the individual success of 
their members through donations of buildings, their decoration, and other 
philanthropic initiatives of patrons willing to be remembered by their succes-
sors (Black [1989]).
Third, studies examining the Mariegolas of the confraternities of Venice 
and the Terraferma do not report any restrictions on the adoption of new 
technologies, production processes or property rights (Monticolo [1892]; 
Gasparini [1987]; Mackenney [1994]). This suggests a neutral attitude of con-
fraternities towards innovation and patenting.
As additional supporting evidence, in column 3 of Appendix Table A-V 
we show that guilds originating from religious confraternities were as likely 
to change their statutes during the period of our study as those not linked to 
religious confraternities. This finding mitigates the concern that the religious 
origin of a guild is simply a proxy for the risk aversion of the guild many 
decades in the future.
VIII. DISTANCE FROM VENICE AND PATENTING
Our empirical analysis has shown that patenting was more pronounced 
in technology fields of  guilds located in cities geographically distant from 
Venice. A possible interpretation of  this finding is that formal protection 
through patent documents was more beneficial to innovators operating fur-
ther away from the center of  political activity. In other words, innovators 
who were close to Venice may have had access to alternative (formal or 
informal) mechanisms to protect their technologies. This interpretation is 
supported by historical evidence that geographical proximity determined a 
special relation between the guilds and the Venetian government. For ex-
ample, Demo [2016] and Caracausi [2016] argue that when conflicts arose 
between Terraferma’s and Venetian guilds, often the government favored 
those located in Venice.
To explore in more detail this issue, we develop an additional measure cap-
turing the political strength of each city. To construct this variable, we collect 
data on the noble families residing across the different cities of the Venetian 
Republic and their marriages with members of the Great Council, the legis-
lative assembly of the Republic. After the 1297 serrata, Great Council mem-
bership was patrilineal hereditary and this restricted political power to 
families of ‘nobili veneti’ the high nobility of the Venetian Republic. While 
the vast majority of these high nobles resided in Venice, in the other cities of 
the dominion some families were recognized with lower nobility statuses such 
as ‘nobili,’ ‘conti’ or ‘nobili palatini.’ Marriages between nobles residing in a 
city and members of the Great Council could be used strategically to increase 
the political influence and create a stronger connection between the city and 
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the center of political power.28 Even if  nobles could not be members of 
guilds, they often supported business activities in their city (Demo [2013]).
To identify high and low nobility families residing in each city of our sam-
ple we digitize the census of the patrician families residing in Veneto and 
nearby regions compiled in the nineteenth century by Schroeder [1830]. For 
each noble family Schroeder reports the date in which the family obtained the 
nobility title and the city in which it resided. This allows us to identify the 
number of noble families residing in each city at the time of the patent act. 
On average there are about 60 noble families for each city in our sample. 
More than 100 noble families were located in Venice while smaller cities, such 
as Udine or Treviso, had fewer than 30 families.29
We combine this digitized census of patrician families with additional data 
to generate our measure of political power. First, exploiting the information 
in Raines [2004], we identify the names of the families with Great Council 
membership. Second, we obtain data on marriages involving a noble hus-
band during the period 1400-1599. Records of these marriages are available 
from the ‘Avogaria di Comun’ of  the Archivio di Stato di Venezia. Puga and 
Trefler [2014] digitized these records, building on the work of nineteenth cen-
tury archivists. Combining these data sources, we construct the indicator 
variable Politically connected families, which equals one if  we identify in the 
city at least one family belonging to the Great Council or linked through 
marriage to a family in the Great Council.30
In column 1 of Table V we show that there is a positive and statistically 
significant correlation between the number of noble families in a city and 
patenting by the guilds in the city. At the same time, the regression also shows 
that the number of noble families in a city explains much more of the variance 
in patents than does its population. Including these controls has no effect on 
the estimates of the effect of geographical distance and internal strength of 
the guild. This finding suggests that patenting is not simply driven by the 
sheer size of the city, but it is likely to be related to other regional charac-
teristics. For example, the presence of noble families in a city may affect the 
quality of its human capital and the availability of financing, and thus spur 
technological activity (Demo [2016]).
In column 2 we introduce the variable Politically connected families, which 
captures the political strength of the city. We find a negative and statistically 
28 Other studies in economics and sociology have examined the network of marriages in 
Medieval Italy. Padgett and Ansell [1993] show that the success of the Medici family in Florence 
was driven by strategic marriage alliances. Puga and Trefler [2014] document the use of marriage 
alliances in Venice to monopolize the galley trade.
29 Six observations had to be dropped from our sample because they are associated with 
smaller cities that were not covered by Schroeder [1830].
30 More than half  of the cities in our sample are not connected to the Great Council according 
to this measure. We use an indicator variable because of the limited variance in this variable 
(apart from Venice, in all the other cities the number of linked families ranges between 0 and 3).
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significant association between the presence of politically connected families 
and patenting, suggesting that formal intellectual property protection may 
have been a substitute for alternative forms of protection available to guilds 
with stronger political connections.31
There is the concern that the results of columns 1 and 2 might be driven 
by Venice because most of the noble families and members of Great Council 
resided in Venice or because of other legal and judicial differences with other 
cities (Knapton [2013]). To address this issue, in column 3 we drop from our 
sample all the Venetian guilds. All our findings are robust to focusing on this 
smaller sample of guilds located in Terraferma.
An additional concern is that more distant cities differ in their human cap-
ital or growth potential and this may be correlated with their political power 
31 In this table standard errors are clustered at the city level as the main variable of interest 
only varies at the level of the city.
table v  
noble familieS and patentinG
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Patents Patents Patents Patents
Strong internal regulation −1.123*** −1.199*** −1.280*** −1.111***
(0.121) (0.124) (0.128) (0.116)
log (Distance) 0.299*** 0.318*** 0.255** 0.393***
(0.034) (0.020) (0.115) (0.061)
log (Noble Families) 0.092*** 0.470*** 0.495*** 0.639***
(0.031) (0.094) (0.097) (0.219)
log (Population1500) 0.102 −0.066 0.001 −0.353
(0.126) (0.070) (0.139) (0.295)
Politically Connected −1.595*** −1.700*** −2.168***
Families (0.361) (0.375) (0.822)
log (Books) 0.146
(0.102)
City Effects No No No No
Drop Venice No No Yes No
Observations 334 334 173 334
Notes: Poisson estimation with robust standard errors clustered at the city level. * significant at 10 per cent, 
** significant at 5 per cent and *** significant at 1 per cent. All regressions include a dummy for Trade guilds. 
Strong internal regulation = 1 if  guild has internal rules which restrict competition, grant privileges to sons 
of members, and restrict rights of foreign members. Distance = distance from Venice in Km. Noble families = 
number of noble families in the city as registered by Schroeder [1830]. Population = inhabitants in 1500 as 
estimated by Malanima [1998]. Politically connected families = 1 if  there is at least one family in the city which 
belongs to the Great Council or is linked through marriages to a family in the Great Council. Books = number 
of printed books in the city in 1500, information from Incunabula Short Title Catalogue.
© 2020 The Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
MARKET POWER AND PATENT STRATEGIES: EVIDENCE FROM VENICE 261
and the propensity to patent. An important determinant of growth and 
human capital for European cities in the 1400’s was the availability of the 
printing press, as documented by Dittmar [2011]. To take this issue into ac-
count, we collect data on the number of printed books available in each city 
of our sample in 1500. This information is obtained from Incunabula Short 
Title Catalogue, a database of the British Library that includes nearly all 
books printed in Europe before the year 1501. For each item, the dataset 
provides authors, titles, language and, more importantly for our scope, date 
and place of printing. In column 4 of Table V, we introduce this control and 
find a positive but statistically insignificant correlation between the number 
of books in a city and patenting. At the same time, all other results on geo-
graphical distance and political power are robust.32
As a final robustness test, we examine the sensitivity of our results to 
our measure of geographical distance. Appendix Table A-VII compares the 
estimates obtained with our preferred measure of distance – which is con-
structed using maps of transportation routes of the Venetian Republic – with 
two alternative distance measures. In column 2 we obtain the distance data 
from the Digital Atlas of Roman and Medieval Civilizations which provides 
maps of the ancient Roman road network (McCormick et al. 2013). In col-
umn 3 we use instead the modern road network (excluding highways) as an 
alternative source of distance. The estimates on the geographical distance 
measures and the other variables are robust and essentially identical across 
the three specifications.
Many other factors may vary across cities, and it is quite likely that omitted 
variables correlated with geographical and political distance are important 
for the propensity to patent. Nonetheless, the correlations reported in Table 
V suggest that the diffusion of the very first patent rights was shaped by 
geographic and political forces. From a theoretical perspective, the relation-
ship between patenting and political or geographical distance from Venice is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, patents might have been easier to enforce for 
inventors located closer to the capital. On the other hand, inventors and guild 
members with greater political connections might have been able to obtain 
protection from the government through other formal or informal channels. 
Our empirical evidence suggests that the second effect dominated the first, 
and that patents were not as widespread among guilds located in the proxim-
ity of Venice and among those in cities with stronger political ties.
A variety of historical accounts can support this interpretation of our 
findings. First, some of the guilds located in the proximity of Venice – such as 
those active in the Arsenal or Murano’s glassblowers – were under close scru-
tiny by the Venetian government, which often passed laws to complement 
their statutes and to provide additional regulation of the sector. Some of 
32 We obtain similar qualitative and quantitative estimates in regressions run on the smaller 
sample in which observations are collapsed at the city level.
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these guild-specific regulations involved technology adoption. Caniato [1996] 
describes various legislative acts related to the Arsenal guild members that 
protected local production (e.g., by burning ships not built in Venice) and 
that rewarded selected foreign shipbuilders. Davanzo Poli [1984] describes 
a senate decision in 1462 that contained provisions supporting the tanner 
and shoemaker guilds of Venice. Manno [1995] describes similar forms of 
protection for glassmakers, blacksmiths, and the silk guild of Venice. Second, 
the Giustizia Vecchia – which was the main magistracy enforcing guild stat-
utes and solving disputes between guild members – was located in Venice 
(Monticolo [1892]; Shaw [2002]). Closer interaction with guilds located in the 
vicinity of Venice may have allowed resolution of disputes on new products 
and processes without the need of formal patent documents.
IX. DISCUSSION
Our empirical analysis has shown that guilds with weak statutes and located 
in cities geographically distant from Venice revealed immediate interest in 
the new form of property rights and patented with greater intensity than 
other guilds. These results resonate with the modern economics of innova-
tion literature, which has documented that patenting strategies vary across 
fields (Levin et al. [1987]), that the effectiveness of patent protection interacts 
with other government policies (Schankerman [1998]), and that patenting is 
less common when firms have high market power (Aghion et al. [2005]). The 
similarity between the IP strategies of contemporary firms and those of the 
pre-industrial economy suggests that the economic forces shaping modern 
patenting behavior are not a unique feature of contemporary technologies.
In her analysis of the origin of modern patent rights, Khan [2005] argues 
that the British and French patent systems were designed to support and 
increase the market power of elites. Differently, she shows that the United 
States system was more democratic, with patents accessible to non-elite in-
ventors. In this respect, our finding that patents were more valuable for in-
novators located in frontier cities without political connections suggests that 
the American patent system was closer to the Venetian experience than were 
the French and British laws.
A natural question that arises is ‘What would have happened to these fron-
tier cities in the absence of the Venetian patent system?’ In the ideal empirical 
experiment, we would compare the economic growth of a Venetian city to the 
economic growth of the same city had the senate not passed the patent act. 
While this counterfactual is not observed, we examine this issue by construct-
ing an empirical proxy for the hypothetical growth in the absence of patent 
rights for two of the cities in our sample, Padua and Vicenza. These two cities 
had roughly similar size in 1500 (the population of Padua was 20,000, that 
of Vicenza was 27,000). Nonetheless, our data show that the share of guilds 
with strong statutes or active in trade (features that tend to reduce patenting 
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according to our findings) was larger in Padua than in Vicenza. Our data also 
show that in Vicenza the proportion of guilds in sectors with high patent-
ing propensity (those using mills and those involved in the textile industry) 
was larger than in Padua. In light of our findings, these features of the local 
economy suggest that the availability of patents had a stronger impact on 
the guilds of Vicenza than on those of Padua. Indeed, we do observe more 
patenting per guild in Vicenza (4.58 patents per guild) than in Padua (1.76 
patents per guild).
We use the synthetic control method (Abadie et  al. [2010]) to obtain a 
graphical representation of the effect of the patent system in the two cities. In 
the synthetic control approach, the control group is constructed through a 
data-driven procedure that aims to reproduce the counterfactual trajectory in 
the absence of a patent system and not simply averaging across cities. We use 
two alternative samples to conduct this exercise. First, we use the dataset 
constructed by Malanima [1998], which reports the population of 543 Italian 
cities during the period 1300-1600. Second, we exploit a smaller sample of 34 
cities in Northern and Central Italy for which we can complement the popu-
lation data with detailed information about the local guilds and their statutes 
(Moioli [2004]). In this more demanding specification, the synthetic controls 
generate cities similar to Vicenza and Padua in terms of population, number 
of guilds, average guild statutory strength, and industry composition. In 
both cases, we construct the synthetic control only from cities outside the 
Venetian Republic, i.e., cities not affected by the Venetian patent act. These 
synthetic controls aim to reproduce the counterfactual trajectories of the two 
cities in the absence of a patent system.33
Appendix Figure A-2 illustrates the findings obtained from the first sam-
ple, in which the synthetic control is constructed by minimizing the difference 
in population growth before the patent act. The exercise shows that the differ-
ence in population growth after 1474 between Vicenza and its synthetic coun-
terpart is much sharper than the corresponding difference between Padua 
and its synthetic counterpart. We also perform the analysis on the smaller 
sample of cities for which we can construct the control group by minimiz-
ing differences in city population, number of guilds, average guild statutory 
strength, and industry composition. Despite the small sample and the spar-
sity of the data, also in these (unreported) graphs we observe an increase in 
Vicenza’s population after 1474 relative to the control group. Such an in-
crease is not observed for Padua where, if  anything, the population appears 
below that of the synthetic control group after the patent act.
33 It is important to notice that our analysis does not compare cities in which guilds were op-
erating in more dynamic sectors with cities in which guilds operated in less dynamic sectors. 
Instead, it compares a city with its synthetic version which is as similar as possible in terms of 
guild composition and industrial activity.
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These figures are only illustrative and should not be over-interpreted as 
unobservable variables may have played a role. For example, the economic 
growth of Vicenza may have been driven by additional factors, such as a 
closer trade relationship with other cities outside the Venetian republic. Or 
the slower growth of Padua may have been affected by the temporary occu-
pation of the city by the imperial troops of Maximilian of Austria in 1509. 
Nonetheless, the estimates suggest that the availability of patents may have 
had some impact on the economic growth of frontier cities and particularly 
so for cities where guilds had weaker statutes. In other words, patents could 
have helped guilds that faced greater difficulties in sharing and managing 
new technologies to become more dynamic.
X. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we study the inventors’ propensity to use patents in the Venetian 
Republic following the 1474 senate act, which instituted the very first regular-
ized patent system. There are two key empirical findings in the paper. First, 
we find a strong negative association between the number of patents granted 
in the technology sector of a guild and the presence of statutory provisions 
limiting entry and competition. Thus, guilds with higher market power relied 
less on patenting to protect innovation. Second, we find that patenting was 
more frequent for guilds located in cities geographically distant from Venice 
and in cities with lower political connection suggesting a potential substi-
tution between intellectual property rights and other forms of formal and 
informal protection.
The innovation literature has documented substantial variation in the rate 
of patenting across industries and in the perceived effectiveness of patents 
across firms (Levin et al. [1987]; Schankerman [1998]; Cohen, Nelson and 
Walsh [2000]). Our analysis shows that similar heterogeneity was present in 
Renaissance Venice, and that it was related to guilds’ market power. Observing 
variation in the use of patents during the pre-industrial era, when the organi-
zation of economic activity was substantially different from the modern one, 
suggests that heterogeneity in patent strategies is a persistent phenomenon 
and not a unique feature of the modern economy. This has implications for 
our understanding of patenting in modern industries. First, our findings sug-
gest that patent strategies are shaped by industry characteristics such as com-
petition and barriers to entry. This is in sharp contrast to theories developed 
in the management literature which emphasize the role of technological fea-
tures of modern industrial products.34 Second, our analysis implies that het-
34 For example, Cohen, Nelson and Walsh [2000] argue that patenting strategies in an industry 
depend substantially on whether product or process are comprised of numerous separately pat-
entable elements (as, for example, in the semiconductor industry) versus relatively few (as, for 
example, in the chemical industry).
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erogeneity in patent strategies is likely to be present in the future, as new 
industries emerge and existing ones lose their relevance. This is particularly 
important given the recent academic and policy debates suggesting that new 
industries are likely to appear over the next few decades because of the tech-
nological developments in artificial intelligence (Agrawal, Gans and Goldfarb 
[2019]).
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